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Abstract 
 
The global economic recession is severely affecting Asian economies. Timely 
assessment of the economic and social impacts is critical to the formulation and 
implementation of policy responses. This paper presents a simple methodology of ex 
ante impact assessment, focusing specifically on how the global recession will affect 
poverty and social expenditures in developing Asian countries. This involves two steps: 
first, to gauge how the crisis will affect national and household incomes; and, second, to 
assess how the income effects are transmitted to poverty and social spending.
1. Introduction 
 
Originated from the United States (US), the subprime mortgage crisis began to affect the 
finance sector in February 2007 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Subprime_mortgage_crisis). 
The financial crisis in the US quickly spread to Europe in 2007/2008. It has blown into a 
full-scale global economic recession since late 2008, which is expected to last until 2010. 
When any crisis strikes, whether a natural disaster or an economic recession, two 
immediate tasks are to evaluate the extent of damage or conduct an impact assessment, 
and to put forward measures to contain the crisis or mitigate its impacts. 
Systematic assessment of the social impact of an economic crisis involves 
understanding several rounds of impacts. First is the impact of an economic crisis on 
income. At the national level, income reduction could be due to lower demand for goods 
and services, rising unemployment, and reduced investment or remittances. At the 
household level, crisis is a negative shock to income, largely from the depreciation in the 
value of assets, job losses, lower remittances, and possibly inflation. Second, income 
reduction inevitably translates into consumption cuts, being private or public spending on 
education, health, even food and other items. Both income reduction and spending cuts 
are most likely to cause increases in both income poverty and non-income poverty. Third 
and as a consequence, particularly if hunger is a result, the social fabric would be 
damaged, potentially leading to disorder, social unrest, environmental degradation, and 
so on.  
This paper aims to assess the impacts of the current recession on poverty and social 
spending in developing Asia. In other words, the paper focuses on the second round of 
impacts. As the crisis is still ongoing, our analysis is inevitably ex ante in nature. The ex 
ante assessment is important for several reasons. First, the assessment can be timely 
and can produce findings and insights for swift policy actions before further damages are 
made by the crisis. Second, the assessment can help prioritize policy actions. As shown 
later in the paper, the estimated crisis impact is much larger on health than on education. 
Thus, protecting the health sector during the crisis should be a priority for governments 
and development partners in Asia. Finally, the assessment in this paper relies on a 
simple but rigorous analytical framework. Thus, our analytical results can be easily 
replicated or updated and can supplement those based on different research techniques. 
As is well known, conducting an impact assessment is a rather difficult task. One 
approach is to make inferences from historical analysis of similar crises or from case 
studies. For example, to understand the impacts of the ongoing crisis in developing Asia, 
one can retrospectively examine the impacts of the 1997 East Asian financial crisis (Wan 
and Francisco 2009). The case study method can also be employed to investigate, say, 
how the ongoing crisis affects the garment industry in Cambodia. These, by and large, 
are ex post analyses. Ex ante assessment of the crisis impacts is even more challenging. 
A recent paper by Hasan et al. (2009) estimated the poverty impact of economic 
slowdown in developing Asia by assuming 1, 2, and 3 percentage point reductions in the 
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growth of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in 2008, 2009, and 2010 than the 
growth in 2007. 
In this paper, a simple and yet rigorous approach will be proposed and applied to crisis 
impact assessment. It involves construction of counterfactuals: poverty and spending 
scenarios in 2009 and 2010 with and without the crisis. Such counterfactuals are 
obtained by using credible growth projections with and without the crisis (see Section 3.1 
for details). These, when combined with growth elasticities of poverty and social 
spending (see Section 3.2 and Appendix A for details), naturally yield the poverty and 
social spending scenarios with and without the crisis.  
It is useful to point out several caveats of this paper. First, our impact assessments rely 
on the growth projections of the Economic Intelligence Unit (EIU). Thus, any errors and 
biases in the projections will carry over to our analytical results. Second, as in Chen and 
Ravallion (2009), we only estimate the aggregate impacts of the crisis, not the impacts at 
the household level. Needless to say, the latter are valuable for the design and 
implementation of relevant policies.  Finally, despite their importance, the non-income 
dimensions of poverty, such as school participation, hunger and malnutrition, and gender 
issues, are not considered in this paper.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a brief overview of the crisis-
impact transmission mechanism, which provides the foundation for the analytical 
framework of the paper. The methodology of ex ante impact assessment and data 
issues are discussed in Section 3. It is worth emphasizing that the methodology makes 
full use of data that are already available. Section 4 presents findings regarding the crisis 
impacts on poverty and social spending and discusses policy implications. The final 
section summarizes the paper.  
2. Transmission Mechanism of the Current Crisis 
Economic crises differ in terms of origin, scope, and consequences. Without 
understanding the transmission mechanism, it would be difficult to establish the link 
between the crisis and socioeconomic indicators such as poverty and spending on 
education or health. From this perspective, a discussion on the transmission mechanism 
is useful. 
Figure 2.1 provides a graphic illustration of the transmission mechanism of the current 
crisis. The very first observation of the current recession is a considerable slowdown or 
negative growth in the industrialized economies. Such a slowdown inevitably leads to 
reductions in trade with, and remittances and capital flows to, Asian economies. In 
addition, the crisis may cause an external shock to the financial markets in Asia. All 
these are detrimental to economic growth in Asia. Reduced growth in Asia, in turn, 
implies less government revenue and drops in household income. As a consequence, 
poverty incidence may rise and the social sectors are almost certainly to be adversely 
affected. 
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Figure. 2.1. Transmission mechanism of the current crisis 
 
 
Source: Authors’ illustration. 
It is clear that in the absence of government interventions, the extent of the crisis 
impacts on social spending and poverty is mainly and ultimately determined by the 
degree of global slowdown. As the most damaging crisis since the Great Depression, the 
current recession means that all industrialized economies are shrinking and are 
expected to experience negative growth in 2009. To illustrate the extent of damage due 
to the crisis, growth projections for the US, Japan, and the Euro zone are tabulated in 
Table 2.1. Obviously, recent projections are far lower than the baseline projections made 
at the onset of the present crisis.  
Table 2.1 Projected real GDP growth (%), World and G3 countries (2008–2011) 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 
 Projection Actual Baseline Latest Baseline Latest Baseline Latest 
World 3.5 3.1 3.4 -1.5 3.3 2.0 3.2 3.5 
United States 2.4 1.1 2.7 -3.1 2.7 0.7 2.7 1.5 
Japan 2.2 -0.7 1.8 -5.9 1.3 0.2 1.7 1.0 
Euro zone 2.2 0.7 2.2 -3.4 2.1 -0.3 2.0 1.2 
Note: All baseline projections were released in August 2007 and the latest and/or revised projections were 
released in April 2009. 
Source: Economic Intelligence Unit Country Forecasts (August 2007 and April 2009). Available at 
www.eiu.com (accessed last 2 April 2009). 
It is important to note that, as Figure 2.1 makes it clear, no matter how crises may differ 
from each other, in the end they all boil down to income contractions at the aggregate 
and household or individual levels. Therefore, it is possible to assess crisis impacts as 
long as the extent of income reductions caused by a crisis can be measured and the 
relationship between income and poverty and social spending can be obtained.  
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3. Research Framework 
As mentioned in the Introduction, assessing the poverty and social spending impacts of 
the current recession involves two steps: (i) obtaining the crisis impact on income, and (ii) 
estimating income effects on poverty and social spending. 
3.1. The crisis impact on income 
In reality, observations on crisis-led changes in income are not available ex ante. 
However, projections of income with and without the crisis can be obtained through a 
number of ways. For instance, income multipliers could be used to estimate the income 
changes in developing Asian countries due to income changes in crisis-affected 
economies. Alternatively, output changes could be ascertained by using output 
multipliers. However, these require detailed information on income and output changes 
due to crisis in the affected economies.  
A more straightforward approach is to use GDP growth projections with and without the 
crisis in lieu of actual changes in GDP growth. The latest GDP growth projections for 
2009 and 2010 could represent the income scenarios with the crisis. Meanwhile, 
baseline GDP projections for 2009 and 2010 that were released just before the onset of 
the crisis can approximate the income scenario without the crisis. The differences 
between the baseline and the latest projections can be taken as the estimates of the 
income shock due to the crisis. Table 3.1 tabulates the baseline and revised and/or 
latest growth projections for selected Asian economies by the Economic Intelligence Unit 
(EIU). Income shocks due to the economic recession are shown in the last two columns.  
EIU’s growth projections are used instead of those from the Asian Development Outlook 
(ADO). This is largely because EIU’s projections permit social impact assessments for 
both 2009 and 2010. Unlike the ADO, EIU provides baseline projections for both years. 
As expected by many and as shown in Table 3.1, the impact of the current recession on 
income is expected to last beyond 2009. Many Asian economies are likely to experience 
slower or even negative growth in 2010.  As a consequence, disregarding the 2010 
picture would mean gross underestimation of the social impact of the crisis. In contrast, 
the ADO is published annually. To be more specific, the baseline period of 2009 EIU 
projections is at the onset of the crisis (September and October 2007), while the 
baseline period of the 2009 ADO projections is April 2008 (more than 6 months into the 
credit squeeze). Quite likely the 2009 ADO projections are contaminated with crisis 
impacts. (See Appendix C for a comparison of ADB’s and EIU’s 2009 baseline and latest 
projections). 
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Table 3.1 Real GDP growth and income shock due to the current crisis  
Country  Baseline projection Revised projection Difference = revised – baseline 
 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 
GDP per capita (% annual change)       
PRC 8.7 8.2 5.5 6.5 -3.2 -1.7 
Bangladesh 4.7 4.2 3.8 2.2 -0.9 -2.0 
India 5.8 5.9 3.4 4.8 -2.4 -1.1 
Sri Lanka 5.5 4.7 2.1 5.3 -3.4 0.6 
Pakistan 4.6 3.8 -0.7 0.6 -5.3 -3.2 
Indonesia 4.5 4.3 -2.4 -0.5 -6.9 -4.8 
Malaysia 4.9 3.8 -4.8 -0.8 -9.7 -4.6 
Philippines 3.7 3.1 -2.3 -0.1 -6.0 -3.2 
Thailand 3.9 4.1 -5.1 1.2 -9.0 -2.9 
Viet Nam 7.0 5.1 -0.7 0.1 -7.7 -5.0 
Asia*  5.0 5.6 -0.3 3.1 -5.3 -2.5 
National GDP (% annual change)       
PRC 9.2 8.7 6.0 7.0 -3.2 -1.7 
Bangladesh 6.4 5.9 5.5 3.9 -0.9 -2.0 
India 7.4 7.5 5.0 6.4 -2.4 -1.1 
Sri Lanka 6.0 5.1 2.6 5.7 -3.4 0.6 
Pakistan 6.2 4.7 1.0 2.3 -5.2 -2.4 
Indonesia 5.7 3.8 -1.3 0.6 -7.0 -3.2 
Malaysia 5.6 4.8 -3.0 1.0 -8.6 -3.8 
Philippines 5.4 4.8 -0.6 4.6 -6.0 -3.2 
Thailand 4.6 4.3 -4.4 2.6 -9.0 -2.5 
Viet Nam 8.0 6.1 0.3 1.1 -7.7 -5.0 
Asia* 6.1 6.7 0.8 4.20 -5.3 -2.5 
GDP = gross domestic product, PRC = People’s Republic of China. 
Note: *Asia includes Asian countries (Bangladesh; PRC; Hong Kong, China; India; Indonesia; Malaysia; 
Pakistan; Philippines; Singapore; Republic of Korea; Sri Lanka; Taipei,China; Thailand; and Viet Nam) and 
Australasia (Australia and New Zealand); it excludes Japan. Projections for Asia without Australasia are not 
available. Numbers may not add up because of rounding. Projections for baseline 2009 were released in 
September 2007 except Bangladesh (October 2007) and Indonesia (November 2007). Projections for 
baseline 2010 were released in October 2008. The revised and/or latest projections were released in April 
2009. 
Source: Economic Intelligence Unit (EIU) Country Forecast. Available at www.eiu.com (accessed last 2 April 
2009). 
We note that unlike EIU’s 2009 baseline projections, EIU’s 2010 baseline projections 
may be contaminated with crisis impacts as these were released only in October 2008. 
This may cause underestimation of the 2010 impact of the crisis. To our best knowledge, 
there is no better alternative to the EIU’s baseline projections. 
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3.2. Estimating crisis impacts on poverty and social spending  
Having obtained the income scenarios with and without the crisis, attention is now turned 
to gauging how poverty head count and social spending may respond to changes in 
income. This is conveniently captured by the concept of elasticity of income with respect 
to poverty and social expenditures. To obtain the poverty elasticity of income, we use 
GDP per capita data from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) Online 
and inequality and poverty head count ratio from the World Bank’s Povcalnet. For social 
spending elasticity estimates, we use the GDP data, public and private spending on 
health, and public spending on education, all available from WDI Online. The data cover 
annual observations of 2001–2005 for health, and of 1998–2006 for education. For 
details on the elasticity estimation methodology, see Appendixes A and B.  
Based on growth projections of Table 3.1 and the poverty elasticity estimates of 
Appendix A, we can easily generate and compare two sets of poverty estimates: one 
using baseline growth projections which yield poverty head count without the crisis, and 
the other using latest growth projections which yield poverty head count with the crisis. 
We take the difference between the two sets and interpret this as the poverty impact of 
the crisis. Similarly, we obtain the crisis impacts on social spending, using the social 
spending elasticity estimates of Appendix B.  
4. Social Impact of the Crisis 
Before presenting the crisis impacts on poverty and social spending, it is appropriate to 
discuss the crisis impacts on wages and employment, as estimated by the EIU.21 These 
estimates are complementary to our poverty impact estimates. 
4.1. Wages and employment  
One most visible impact of the current recession is increased unemployment. Such an 
impact is caused directly by reduced export from Asia, compounded by reduced growth. 
The well-known Phillips curve portrays an inverse relationship between economic growth 
and unemployment. Some empirical studies confirm this curve. For example, in the US, 
unemployment rate drops by 2% for every 1% increase in GDP growth (Mankiw 2003). 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) discovered that severe financial crises in the past had 
lasting effects on output and employment (Reinhart 2009). On average, these crises led 
to more than 9% decline in real GDP per capita over 2 years and 7 percentage points 
increase in unemployment over several years. 
In the People’s Republic of China (PRC), fast growth and trade expansion have not only 
supported increased employment but also promoted rapid transformation in employment 
structure, shifting labor to the manufacturing sector (Cai and Wang 2006). Contrary to 
the normal scenario, agricultural employment contracts during booms and expands 
 
21 Because the growth–employment relationship is beyond the scope of the current paper, the 
EIU’s wage and employment estimates are presented. 
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during recessions. For 1991–1995 and 2001–2005, employment elasticity in agriculture 
ranged from -0.43 to -0.29. During 1996–2000, on the other hand, the elasticity was 0.09. 
Employment in the non-agriculture sectors behaves in the usual way. Hence, growth in 
total employment is sustained even during the second half of the 1990s when GDP 
growth decelerated. As such, total employment elasticity remained positive for 1991–
1995 (0.08), 1996–2000 (0.14), and 2001–2005 (0.11).  
Clearly, unemployment rates will increase in many Asian economies as external and 
internal demands continue to slow down (Table 4.1). Fast-growing East and Southeast 
Asian economies will suffer the most in terms of unemployment. In addition, real wages 
are expected to drop further in 2009, after posting negative growth already in 2008 in 
most Southeast Asian economies. Reductions in real wages from 2007 to 2008 were 
dramatic for Taipei,China, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan. Unlike in the 1997 crisis, remittances 
cannot be relied on to compensate for losses in wage and household income because 
the source countries are badly affected and most Asian currencies have not seen 
depreciations. 
Table 4.1 Estimated and projected unemployment rate (%) and average real wages (annual 
change, %), selected Asian countries (2007–2010) 
Region/Economy Unemployment rate  Real wages, annual change (%) 
2007 2008 2009 2010  2007 2008 2009 2010 
East Asia          
PRC  9.20 9.00 10.10 10.60  13.29 7.70 3.40 5.70 
Hong Kong, 
China 
4.00 3.50 5.90 6.80  1.90 -0.30 -2.10 -1.30 
Korea, Rep.of 3.25 3.18 6.10 7.10  3.50 0.90 -7.00 -3.00 
Taipei,China 3.91 4.14 8.40 8.80  -0.10 -3.70 -4.90 -0.80 
Southeast Asia          
Indonesia 9.10 8.50 10.70 11.40  1.60 -3.00 -3.30 -2.30 
Malaysia 3.23 3.70 5.60 4.90  1.90 -0.90 0.90 -0.90 
Philippines 7.33 7.40 8.30 8.70  0.60 -1.20 -1.40 -0.60 
Singapore 2.13 2.25 4.50 4.60  4.00 -1.05 -0.50 1.50 
Thailand 1.40 1.40 4.10 4.40  2.20 -0.40 -0.30 0.30 
Viet Nam 4.60 4.70 8.20 7.50  2.00 2.00 0.60 1.70 
South Asia          
Bangladesh 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50  2.90 0.60 0.60 2.20 
India 6.70 6.80 7.20 7.60  4.10 -4.40 -4.30 -1.80 
Sri Lanka 5.97 5.80 7.00 7.30  -7.40 -14.40 5.80 2.00 
PRC = People’s Republic of China. 
Note: 2007 and 2008 are estimates; 2009–2010 are projections. 
Source: Economic Intelligence Unit (EIU) database. Available at www.eiu.com (accessed last 2 April 2009). 
In passing, it is noted that during the 1997 Asian financial crisis, labor and wage shocks 
affected male and female workers differently across crisis-affected countries. In addition, 
the increase in unemployment and reduction in labor participation (among 15 years and 
above) translated into significant reductions in household consumption across the 
affected countries, except in the Philippines where growth in household expenditure 
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remained relatively stable due to increased remittance and depreciation of the peso 
(Wan and Francisco 2009).  
4.2. Poverty impact 
As our estimates of poverty elasticity of growth show, poverty reduction is significantly 
and positively related to income growth in developing Asian countries (Appendix Table 
A5). Thus, slower income growth implies slower poverty reduction while negative growth 
means increases in poverty incidence. This is also supported by past evidence. During 
the 1997 Asian crisis, poverty incidence in Indonesia increased by 8.9 percentage points 
(from 11% to 19.9% in 1998) and by 9 percentage points in the Philippines (Wan and 
Francisco 2009, Frankenberg et al. 1999, Datt and Hoogeveen 2003). 
Tables 4.2a and 4.2b present the poverty impact of the current recession. As expected, 
the crisis will adversely affect poverty reduction in all Asian countries. What is of serious 
concern is that the recession may cause increases in both 2009 and 2010, in the 
absolute number of poor individuals or households in Malaysia,Indonesia, Pakistan, the 
Philippines, and Thailand. In Indonesia, for instance, poverty incidence is estimated to 
increase in 2009 by 3.2% over the estimated 17.7% head count ratio of 2008 and further 
to increase by 0.7% in 2010 over the estimated 18.3% head count ratio of 2009. Hence, 
the head count ratio is expected to rise from an estimate of only 17.7% (under the $1.25 
poverty line) in 2008 to 18.4% in 2010.22  
It is more revealing to contrast poverty reduction under the no-crisis scenario with that 
under-crisis scenario. Poverty incidence in Indonesia, for instance, could be reduced 
from 21.4% in 2005 to around 15.7% in 2010 in the absence of the recession (Table 
4.2b). However, with the foreseen negative growth in 2009 and 2010, the poverty 
incidence in Indonesia is expected to drop to 18.4% only in 2010, assuming the crisis 
would not worsen income distribution. This means that Indonesia will forego 2.7% 
reduction in the head count ratio due to the current crisis. This forgone poverty reduction 
represents 6.54 million people who will remain or become poor due to the crisis. The 
foregone poverty reduction is even higher in Viet Nam (2.9%) and slightly lower but still 
above 2% for both Pakistan and the Philippines. In India, growth is predicted to remain 
positive in 2009 and 2010. The poverty impact of reduced growth is quite severe. The 
foregone poverty reduction is estimated to be 1.4%. In other words, almost 18 million 
Indians who might have stepped out of poverty are expected to remain poor due to the 
recession. 
 
22 The 2010 figure might underestimate the crisis impact on poverty because the 2010 baseline 
projection may be contaminated, as discussed in Section 3.1.   
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Table 4.2a Annual changes (%) in poverty head count ratio ($1.25 and $2 PPP a day, selected 
Asian countries) 
Poverty line 
 
Projection using baseline GDP 
per capita projection 
Projection using revised GDP 
per capita projection 
Difference (revised – baseline) 
 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010* 
$1.25 PPP a day       
PRC -10.2 -9.6 -6.5 -7.6 3.8 2.0 
Bangladesh -3.5 -3.1 -2.8 -1.6 0.7 1.5 
India -4.6 -4.6 -2.7 -3.8 1.9 0.9 
Sri Lanka -6.7 -5.8 -2.6 -6.5 4.2 -0.7 
Pakistan -6.4 -5.3 1.0 -0.8 7.3 4.4 
Indonesia -6.0 -5.8 3.2 0.7 9.2 6.4 
Malaysia -11.1 -8.6 10.9 1.8 22.0 10.5 
Philippines -4.4 -3.7 2.7 0.1 7.2 3.8 
Thailand** -55.4 -58.3 72.5 -17.1 127.9 41.2 
Viet Nam -7.9 -5.7 0.8 -0.1 8.7 5.6 
Asia***  -4.6 -5.2 0.3 -2.9 4.9 2.3 
$2 PPP a day       
PRC -5.3 -5.0 -3.3 -3.9 1.9 1.0 
Bangladesh -2.1 -1.9 -1.7 -1.0 0.4 0.9 
India -2.2 -2.2 -1.3 -1.8 0.9 0.4 
Sri Lanka -4.2 -3.6 -1.6 -4.1 2.6 -0.5 
Pakistan -1.9 -1.6 0.3 -0.3 2.2 1.4 
Indonesia -1.8 -1.7 1.0 0.2 2.8 1.9 
Malaysia -16.2 -12.5 15.8 2.6 32.0 15.2 
Philippines -2.3 -1.9 1.4 0.1 3.7 2.0 
Thailand -7.9 -8.3 10.3 -2.4 18.3 5.9 
Viet Nam -3.6 -2.6 0.4 -0.1 4.0 2.6 
Asia -2.3 -2.6 0.1 -1.4 2.5 1.2 
GDP = gross domestic product, PPP = purchasing power parity, PRC = People’s Republic of China. 
Note: Data from Table 3.1 and our poverty elasticity estimates (Annex A1) were used to generate projected 
changes in head count ratio. Numbers may not add up because of rounding. *2010 estimates may be 
underestimated since 2010 baseline growth projection may be contaminated with crisis impact (see Section 
3.1 for more details). **Values for Thailand ($1.25 poverty line) may not be reliable since the head count 
ratio for Thailand is close to zero. ***Asia includes all 21 countries where poverty elasticity estimate is 
available (Annex A1).  
Source: Authors’ estimates. 
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Table 4.2b Poverty head count ratio ($1.25 and $2 PPP a day), actual and projections based on 
baseline and revised GDP per capita projections, selected Asian countries (2005, 2008–2010) 
 Actual Projection using baseline 
GDP per capita 
projection 
Projection using revised 
GDP per capita 
projection 
Difference  
(revised – baseline) 
Poor (M) 
 2005 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010* 
$ 1.25 PPP a day         
PRC 15.9 9.4 8.5 10.0 9.2 0.5 0.7 9.26 
Bangladesh 48.3 41.9 40.6 42.2 41.5 0.3 0.9 1.54 
India 41.6 33.4 31.9 34.6 33.3 1.2 1.4 17.73 
Sri Lanka 10.3 7.6 7.1 7.9 7.4 0.4 0.3 0.06 
Pakistan 22.6 17.6 16.7 19.0 18.8 1.4 2.1 3.75 
Indonesia 21.4 16.6 15.7 18.3 18.4 1.6 2.7 6.54 
Malaysia 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.04 
Philippines 22.6 18.6 17.9 20.2 20.2 1.6 2.3 2.18 
Thailand** 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.04 
Viet Nam 22.8 16.3 15.4 18.3 18.2 1.9 2.9 2.62 
Total        43.75 
Asia*** 27.1 21.3 20.2 22.7 22.0 1.3 1.8 64.07 
$ 2 PPP a day         
PRC 36.3 28.0 26.6 28.7 27.6 0.8 1.0 13.93 
Bangladesh 80.3 73.7 72.3 74.1 73.3 0.3 1.0 1.65 
India 75.6 68.1 66.6 69.3 68.0 1.1 1.4 17.22 
Sri Lanka 34.4 28.3 27.3 29.2 28.0 0.8 0.7 0.13 
Pakistan 60.3 56.0 55.1 57.3 57.1 1.3 2.0 3.55 
Indonesia 53.8 49.9 49.0 51.3 51.4 1.4 2.4 5.77 
Malaysia 7.8 4.2 3.7 6.2 6.4 2.0 2.7 0.76 
Philippines 45.0 40.7 39.9 42.5 42.5 1.8 2.6 2.44 
Thailand 11.5 8.1 7.5 10.2 10.0 2.1 2.5 1.64 
Viet Nam 50.5 43.5 42.3 45.7 45.7 2.2 3.3 3.06 
Total        50.16 
Asia*** 54.2 48.1 46.8 49.5 48.8 1.5 2.0 72.19 
GDP = gross domestic product, PPP = purchasing power parity, PRC = People’s Republic of China. 
Note: Estimates of poverty head count ratios were derived using estimated changes in poverty head count 
presented in Table 4.2a and 2005 actual head count ratio. The number of poor population affected by the 
crisis was estimated using the difference between baseline and revised projected 2010 head count ratios 
and 2010 population projection by UN Population Division in World Population Prospects: the 2008 Revision 
(available at: http://esa.un.org/unpp/, accessed last 8 April 2009) for the countries mentioned above. 
Numbers may not add up because of rounding. *2010 estimates may be underestimated since 2010 
baseline growth projection may be contaminated with crisis impact (see Section 3.1 for more details). 
**Values for Thailand ($1.25 poverty line) may not be reliable since the head count for Thailand is close to 
zero. ***Asia includes all 21 countries where poverty elasticity estimate is available (Annex A1).  
Source: Authors’ estimates. 
For developing Asia as a whole (excluding Central Asia), the recession is estimated to 
prevent a total of 64 million people from stepping out of poverty under the $1.25 PPP 
/day line (Table 4.2b) over 2009–2010. In addition, another 8 million people will remain 
or fall below the $2 PPP/day poverty line in the same period due to the crisis. Hence, 
under the $2 PPP /day poverty line, the poverty impact of the crisis will be experienced 
by around 72 million Asians over 2009–2010. These estimates seem consistent with 
How Is the Global Recession Impacting on Poverty and Social Spending? | 11 
 
 
those implicitly suggested by Chen and Ravallion (2009). They employed a similar ex 
ante assessment approach and produced estimates of 73 million and 91 million for the 
world (versus our estimates of 64 million and 72 million for Asia). It is noted that global 
poverty is concentrated in Asia and Africa but the crisis impact on Africa is relatively mild. 
So far the estimation results presented in this section are obtained under the assumption 
of distribution-neutral growth. It is important to note that since the poverty elasticity of 
inequality is positive, if the current recession causes inequality to rise, the actual poverty 
picture may well be more severe than these results suggest. Based on our elasticity 
estimates, for every one percentage point rise in inequality (as measured by the Gini 
coefficient), the head count ratios in developing Asia under $1.25 and $2 PPP/day are 
expected to increase by 0.36 and 0.11 percentage points respectively (or in absolute 
numbers, 13 million and 3.4 million more poor).  Alternatively, if inequality declines by 
1% during 2009–2010, 13 million extremely poor and 3.4 million moderately poor in Asia 
will be lifted out of poverty. 
4.3. Impacts on education and health spending 
Appendix B presents and discusses short- and long- run estimates of spending elasticity 
of growth for health and education expenditures. As shown in Table B1 of Appendix B, a 
1% increase or decrease in per capita GDP growth in year 1 translates into 0.5%–0.8% 
increase or decrease in per capita private health spending, 0.5%–0.7% increase or 
decrease in per capita public health spending, and 0.3%–0.5% increase or decrease in 
per capita public education spending in year 1. Clearly, the instant impact of the crisis on 
private health spending is larger than that on public health spending, and health 
spending is more responsive to crisis than education spending in the very short run. 
The reduction in social spending in year 1 will, in turn, affect social spending in 
subsequent years as shown in Table B2 of Appendix B. Specifically, a 1% increase or 
decrease in per capita GDP growth in year 1 translates into a 0.19%–0.31% increase or 
decrease in per capita private health spending, 0.18%–0.25% increase or decrease in 
per capita public health spending, and 0.18%–0.27% increase or decrease in per capita 
public education spending in year 2. By the same token, the impacts for year 3 of the 
first year change will be a 0.07%–0.11% increase or decrease in per capita private 
health spending, 0.07%–0.09% increase or decrease in per capita public health 
spending, and 0.09%–0.14% increase or decrease in per capita public education 
spending. The impacts of the change in per capita GDP growth in year 1 will continue in 
subsequent years, albeit at an increasingly limited pace than in previous years. In the 
long run, the 1% increase or decrease in per capita GDP growth in year 1 translates into 
a total of 0.8%–1.3% increase or decrease in per capita private health spending, 0.8%–
1.1% increase or decrease in per capita public health spending, and 0.7%–1.1% 
increase or decrease in per capita public education spending. Clearly, reduced growth 
due to the crisis means lasting impacts on basic social services such as health and 
education, as in the 1997 crisis (Wan and Francisco 2009).  
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Table 4.3 presents projected annual growth in health and education spending in 2009 
and 2010 with and without the recession. It shows that per capita private health 
spending is expected to drop from its 2008 level in Thailand (by -2.9%), Malaysia (-
2.9%), Indonesia (-1.3%), the Philippines (-1.3%), and Pakistan (-0.4%). (See rows 
under the heading of "Difference (b) - (a)” in Table 4.3.) However, for many Asian 
countries, despite the recession, health and education expenditures are expected to 
continue to expand in 2009 and 2010, albeit at a limited pace (see rows under the 
heading of “% annual change, revised (b)” in Table 4.3). Clearly, the crisis is expected to 
exert negative impacts on social spending that are substantial in many developing Asian 
countries. In Malaysia, for instance, the reduction in per capita private health spending 
over 2008–2009 amounts to almost 6 percentage points. In addition, Malaysia is 
expected to lose 2.8% increase in per capita private health spending from 2009 to 2010, 
if no appropriate protection program is implemented. In terms of per capita public health 
spending, the difference amounts to 6.6 percentage points over 2008–2009 and 3.1 
percentage points over 2009–2010.23 
From 2008 to 2009, the short-run crisis impact on per capita private health spending is 
most serious for Malaysia (-5.8 percentage points loss in spending growth), followed by 
Thailand (-5.1 percentage points), and Viet Nam (-5.7 percentage points). From 2009 to 
2010, the loss is quite high in Viet Nam (-3.7 percentage points loss), Malaysia (-2.8 
percentage points), and Indonesia (-2.6% percentage points). Turning to public health 
spending, the short-run crisis impact is most serious in Malaysia from 2008 to 2009 and 
from 2009 to 2010 (-6.6 and -3.1 percentage points losses, respectively). In terms of per 
capita public education expenditure, the negative short-run crisis impact is highest in 
Malaysia over 2008–2009 and 2009–2010 (-4.6 and -2.9 percentage points, 
respectively). 
Although health spending is more responsive to income changes, the short-run impact of 
the crisis in terms of absolute value is larger on education than on health spending. This 
is because the public education budget is usually much larger than health budget. As a 
consequence, the ratio of forgone increases in per capita public education spending to 
per capita public health due to the recession is around 1.2 in the case of the Philippines 
and 3 in the case of Pakistan. 
So far, attention has been mainly focused on the short-run impacts of the recession. 
While policy makers seem to be often interested more in the short-run impacts, it is 
important to point out that the crisis impacts in the long-run are larger than that in the 
short-run, as indicated by our elasticity estimates (see Appendix B for more details). 
Table 4.4 compares the short-run versus cumulative crisis impact on per capita social 
spending from 2009 to 2011. Whereas the short-run impact accounts for the GDP 
shocks that occurred in the same year only, the cumulative impact accounts for the 
lagged impact of the GDP shock that occurred in the previous year(s) in addition to the 
 
23 Similar to the estimates of the poverty impact, the 2010 spending impacts could also be an 
underestimate of the 2010 actual crisis impact on poverty (see Section 3.1 for more details). 
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short-run impact. Table 4.4 suggests that the ratio of cumulative impact to short-run 
impact in 2009–2010 ranges from 2.1 to 2.8 in both per capita private and public health 
spending, and from 2.4 to 3.3 in per capita public education spending. Clearly, large 
differences exist between the short- and long-run impacts on social spending. This 
difference is particularly striking in the case of public spending on education.  
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Table 4.3 Projected annual change in per capita health and education spending, 2008–2010 
 Private Health Public Health Public Education 
 2005 2009 2010 2005 2009 2010 2005 2009 2010 
PRC, actual $ PPP 11,774  7,455                
% annual change, baseline (a)  5.43 5.11 5.88 5.54 — 3.44 3.24
% annual change, revised (b)  3.43 4.05 3.71 4.39 2.17 2.57
Difference (b) - (a)  -2.00 -1.06 -2.16 -1.15 -1.27 -0.67
Difference, $ PPP  -285 -456 -198 -318 — — 
Bangladesh, actual $ PPP 2,126  870  2,916  
% annual change, baseline (a)  2.77 2.48 2.88 2.57 1.87 1.67
% annual change, revised (b)  2.24 1.30 2.32 1.35 1.51 0.87
Difference (b) - (a)  -0.53 -1.18 -0.55 -1.22 -0.36 -0.79
Difference, $ PPP  -12 -40 -5 -17 -11 -36
India, actual $ PPP 9,031  2,118  7,247  
% annual change, baseline (a)  3.75 3.82 3.60 3.66 2.54 2.58
% annual change, revised (b)  2.20 3.11 2.11 2.98 1.49 2.10
Difference (b) - (a)  -1.55 -0.71 -1.49 -0.68 -1.05 -0.48
Difference, $ PPP  -159 -239 -36 -53 -83 -123
Pakistan, actual $ PPP 3,779  803  4,915  
% annual change, baseline (a)  2.66 2.19 2.54 2.10 1.85 1.53
% annual change, revised (b)  -0.40 0.35 -0.39 0.33 -0.28 0.24
Difference (b) - (a)  -3.06 -1.85 -2.93 -1.77 -2.13 -1.29
Difference, $ PPP  -124 -202 -25 -41 -110 -178
Sri Lanka, actual $ PPP 7,836  6,717  —              
% annual change, baseline (a)  3.30 2.82 3.70 3.16 — — 
% annual change, revised (b)  1.26 3.18 1.41 3.57 — — 
Difference (b) - (a)  -2.04 0.36 -2.29 0.40 — — 
Difference, $ PPP  -179 -152 -174 -148 — — 
Indonesia, actual $ PPP 3,595  3,141  9,179  
% annual change, baseline (a)  2.47 2.36 2.79 2.66 1.92 1.83
% annual change, revised (b)  -1.32 -0.27 -1.49 -0.31 -1.02 -0.21
Difference (b) - (a)  -3.79 -2.64 -4.27 -2.97 -2.94 -2.05
Difference, $ PPP  -147 -252 -146 -250 -287 -489
Malaysia, actual $ PPP 27,094  21,974  —              
% annual change, baseline (a)  2.94 2.28 3.33 2.58 2.34 1.81
% annual change, revised (b)  -2.88 -0.48 -3.27 -0.54 -2.29 -0.38
Difference (b) - (a)  -5.82 -2.76 -6.60 -3.13 -4.63 -2.19
Difference, $ PPP  -1,680 -2,492 -1,557 -2,311 — — 
Philippines, actual $ PPP 6,000  3,462  7,508  
% annual change, baseline (a)  2.18 1.83 2.37 1.99 1.54 1.29
% annual change, revised (b)  -1.36 -0.06 -1.47 -0.06 -0.95 -0.04
Difference (b) - (a)  -3.54 -1.89 -3.85 -2.05 -2.49 -1.33
Difference, $ PPP  -227 -351 -143 -221 -196 -302
Thailand, actual $ PPP 8,907  15,810  29,902  
% annual change, baseline (a)  2.19 2.30 2.70 2.84 1.77 1.86
% annual change, revised (b)  -2.86 0.67 -3.53 0.83 -2.32 0.55
Difference (b) - (a)  -5.05 -1.63 -6.23 -2.01 -4.09 -1.32
Difference, $ PPP  -476 -637 -1,057 -1,415 -1,281 -1,708
Viet Nam, actual $ PPP 9,557  3,304  —              
% annual change, baseline (a)  5.22 3.80 0.38 0.28 7.48 5.45
% annual change, revised (b)  -0.52 0.07 -0.04 0.01 -0.75 0.11
Difference (b) - (a)  -5.74 -3.73 -0.42 -0.27 -8.23 -5.35
Difference, $ PPP  -633.37 -1,066.59 -14.04 -23.18 — — 
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PPP = purchasing power parity , PRC = People’s Republic of China. 
Note: “–“ 2005 data unavailable in WDI Online. *2010 impacts are likely to be underestimated since 2010 
baseline growth projection may be contaminated with crisis impact (see Section 3.1 for more details). 
Source: Authors’ estimates. 
Table 4.4 Projected annual change and cumulative annual change in per capita health and 
education spending, 2008–2011* 
Country Private Health Public Health Public Education 
 2008-
2009 
2009-
2010 
2010-
2011 
2009-
2011 
2008-
2009 
2009-
2010 
2010-
2011 
2009-
2011 
2008-
2009 
2009-
2010 
2010-
2011 
2009-
2011 
PRC, Short-run impact -285 -456 -740 -198 -318  -517 — — — — 
Cumulative impact -285 -1,000 -691 -1,975 -198 -694 -481 -1,373 — — — — 
Difference   -1,235   -856   — 
Bangladesh, Short-run 
impact 
-12 -40 -53 -5 -17  -22 -11 -36 -47 
Cumulative impact -12 -77 -58 -147 -5 -33 -25 -62 -11 -85 -58 -155 
Difference   -95   -40   -108 
India, Short-run impact -159 -239 -398 -36 -53  -89 -83 -123 -206 
Cumulative impact -159 -519 -360 -1,038 -36 -115 -80 -230 -83 -335 -214 -633 
Difference   -640   -141   -426 
Pakistan, Short-run impact -124 -202 -326 -25 -41  -66 -110 -178 -288 
Cumulative impact -124 -300 -297 -722 -25 -60 -60 -145 -110 -304 -302 -716 
Difference   -396   -79   -428 
Sri Lanka, Short-run impact -179 -152 -330 -174 -148  -322 — — — — 
Cumulative impact -179 -363 -238 -780 -174 -352 -232 -758 — — — — 
Difference   -450   -436   — 
Indonesia, Short-run impact -147 -252 -399 -146 -250  -396 -287 -489 -776 
Cumulative impact -147 -357 -368 -872 -146 -354 -364 -865 -287 -786 -822 -1,895 
Difference   -474   -468   -1,119 
Malaysia, Short-run impact -1,680 -2,492 -4,172 -1,557 -2,311  -3,868 — — — — 
Cumulative impact -1,680 -3,504 -3,664 -8,848 -1,557 -3,238 -3,381 -8,176 — — — — 
Difference   -4,676   -4,307   — 
Philippines, Short-run impact -227 -351 -579 -143 -221  -365 -196 -302 -498 
Cumulative impact -227 -503 -516 -1,246 -143 -316 -324 -783 -196 -491 -512 -1,199 
Difference   -668   -418   -700 
Thailand, Short-run impact -476 -637 -1,113 -1,057 -1,415  -2,472 -1,281 -1,708 -2,989 
Cumulative impact -476 -928 -942 -2,346 -1,057 -2,055 -2,082 -5,194 -1,281 -2,830 -2,931 -7,043 
Difference   -1,233   -2,722   -4,053 
Viet Nam, Short-run impact -633 -1,067 -1,700 -14 -23  -37 — — — — 
Cumulative impact -633 -1,576 -1,581 -3,791 -14 -34 -34 -81 — — — — 
Difference   -2,091   -44   — 
PRC = People’s Republic of China. 
Notes: Short-run impact equals short-run elasticity times the change in GDP. Cumulative impact equals the 
sum of the short-run impact in year t and the spillover effects of the changes in spending in year t-1. See 
Appendix B for more details about estimation procedure; and Appendix Table B1 for elasticity estimates. “–
“ data in actual 2005 levels not available in WDI Online. 
Source: Authors’ estimates. 
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5. Summary and Suggestions for Further Research 
This paper presents a simple and practical yet novel methodology for ex ante 
assessment of the crisis impact. It is built on reliable income growth projections with and 
without the crisis and various estimates of elasticity of income. This methodology allows 
timely assessment of economic and social impacts of the ongoing crisis, which is crucial 
in formulating evidenced-based policies to mitigate the impact of the crisis. 
As expected, the current crisis is found to negatively impact employment, poverty, and 
social spending. Based on the analytical results of this paper, the following messages 
stand out as important and interesting:  
 First, the current crisis will adversely affect poverty reduction. In developing Asian 
countries alone, a total of 64 million people who could have stepped out of poverty will 
remain below the $1.25 PPP /day poverty line due to the crisis. An additional 8 million 
will remain below the $2 PPP /day poverty line. 
 Second, spending on health in Asia is much more responsive to crisis than that on 
education, both in the short-run and long-run. Thus, policy interventions and donor 
assistances for crisis management should prioritize heath, relative to education.  
 Third, the impacts of crises differ considerably from country to country and from sector 
to sector. Therefore, one size does not fit all and interventions by national 
governments and international agencies must be country and sector specific.  
 Fourth, most developing countries in Asia are expected to continue their increases in 
overall social spending in 2009, although such increases, driven by positive but 
reduced GDP growth, would have been larger if the crisis did not occur. In other words, 
the crucially needed optimism or confidence is justified and should be conveyed to the 
general public and business community.  
 Finally, the long-run impacts of the current crisis are not negligible and deserve 
serious policy considerations and further research efforts. 
 
Future research efforts are needed to fully explore policy implications of these findings, 
including what they mean to various government departments, different income classes, 
and development agencies; how they can be incorporated in concrete policy formulation 
and implementation; and what are the fundamental factors or forces behind these 
research results. 
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Appendix A. Interrelationship between poverty, economic growth, and income inequality 
While poverty and economic growth are negatively correlated, the relationship between income 
inequality and poverty is positive. Whether economic growth can lead to poverty reduction or not 
depends on the relative magnitudes of the growth and inequality effects on poverty (Ravallion and 
Chen 1997, Kakwani and Pernia 2000). These magnitudes are partially determined by the growth 
and inequality elasticities of poverty. 
Previous estimates  
Various methodologies are available for obtaining the growth or inequality elasticity. Kakwani 
(1993) proposed the following formula for estimating the poverty elasticity of growth HG , based 
on the Foster, Greer, and Thorbecke (1984) poverty measure: 
where H is head count ratio, G is income, PG is poverty gap,  SP is squared poverty gap, and  
is the index of inequality aversion.24 
An alternative approach is given by Ravallion (1997), who developed a distribution-corrected 
poverty elasticity of growth, which can be estimated by running the following OLS regression:  
 h  (1 I )g  	         
 (A2) 
where h  
H /H  is the rate of change in poverty incidence, I indicates income inequality, and 
g  
G /G  is the rate of change in average household income. The distribution-corrected 
poverty elasticity of growth is 
HG  = (1 I )  (A3) 
Equation (A3) implies that countries with higher initial inequality would have slower rate of poverty 
reduction for every 1% increase in average household income. Ravallion fitted (A2) to household 
survey data (two spells) from 23 developing countries, and found that the   estimate is 4.43 (t-
ratio = 4.7, R2 = 0.36).   
In a highly controversial paper, Dollar and Kraay (2002) examined the poverty–growth 
relationship using 1950–1999 data from 137 countries. Relying on the standard generalized 
method of moments (GMM) procedure, they estimated the following system of equations: 
 
24 Kakwani proposed an inequality–growth trade-off index (IGTI), defined as IGTI = |
HG /HI | 
where the denominator is inequality elasticity of poverty. It measures how much growth in mean 
income (or expenditure) is required to offset a 1% increase in inequality, holding poverty constant. 
 
H
G
G
H
 = HG   = 
 

(H  PG)
PG
 
if 
 ( = 1) 
 (A1)  

2(PG  SP)
SP
 ( = 2) 
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 1(Git Gi,tk(c,t ) ) 2(Xit Gi,tk(c,t ) ) (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i,tk(c,t ) )  (A5) 
where GP is the income of the poorest income quintile and X  are a set of control variables. 
Based on the fitted model, (GP /GP ) / (G /G)= 1.07, meaning that for every 1% increase in 
the national average income, the poor gains 1.07%. They claimed that this finding holds across 
regions, time periods, income levels, and growth rates. 
Using the methodology proposed by Kakwani (1993), Son and Kakwani (2004) estimated poverty 
elasticity of growth for selected Asian countries under three growth scenarios (Table A1). Son 
(2007) expanded the earlier work to include 1981 – 2001 data from 17 Asian countries. India’s 
and the People’s Republic of China's poverty elasticity of growth and of inequality from Son (2007) 
are reproduced in Table A2 below. 
Table A1. Growth elasticity of poverty 
Scenario (1) Pro-poor growth (2) Neutral growth (3) Pro-rich growth 
Country ($ 1 PPP/day) ($ 2 PPP/day) ($ 1 PPP/day) ($ 2 PPP/day) ($ 1 PPP/day) ($ 2 PPP/day) 
PRC -3 -1.1 -2.2 -1 -1.5 -0.9 
Indonesia -3.3 -1.3 -2.4 -1.1 -1.5 -0.9 
Korea -9.8 -6.1 -5.4 -3.8 -1.3 -1.7 
Malaysia -3.5 -2 -1.9 -1.3 -0.5 -0.6 
Philippines -2.9 -1.4 -1.8 -1.1 -0.9 -0.7 
Thailand -3.3 -1.7 -1.9 -1.2 -0.7 -0.7 
Bangladesh -3 -0.8 -2.3 -0.8 -1.8 -0.8 
India -2.2 -0.6 -1.8 -0.6 -1.4 -0.6 
Nepal -2.5 -0.8 -1.9 -0.7 -1.4 -0.7 
Pakistan -2 -0.6 -1.6 -0.6 -1.2 -0.6 
Sri Lanka -5.7 -2.5 -3.8 -2 -2.1 -1.5 
PPP = purchasing power parity, PRC = People’s Republic of China. 
Source: Son and Kakwani 2004. 
Table A2. Poverty elasticity* for India and the People’s Republic of China (1984–2001) 
 Growth elasticity Inequality elasticity 
 China, People’s Rep. of India China, People’s Rep. of India 
Year Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban 
1984 –1.56 –4.89 –1.37 –2.45 0.14 7.16 0.12 1.85 
1987 –1.67 –3.91 –1.63 –2.19 0.56 7.78 0.29 1.73 
1990 –1.75 –4.03 –1.76 –2.44 0.49 8.23 0.32 2.02 
1993 –1.88 –3.88 –1.81 –2.56 0.72 10.82 0.35 2.37 
1996 –2.37 –3.92 –1.80 –2.88 1.9 13.43 0.35 3.1 
1999 –2.13 –3.43 –2.01 –2.54 1.73 14.26 0.59 2.92 
2001 –2.12 –3.70 – 4.84 1.85 17.91 – – 
Notes: *Elasticity estimates for distribution neutral growth. Estimates for other countries are not 
presented in Son's paper. 
Source: Son 2007. 
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To estimate poverty elasticity of growth in the five subregions in Asia, Hasan et al. (2009) fitted 
poverty, inequality, and GDP per capita data (1990–2005) of 24 Asian countries, from World Bank 
Povcalnet and World Bank World Development Indicators database, to  
lnPit     lnGit  	it .  (A6) 
Table A3 shows the estimates by Hasan et al. (2009). 
Table A3. Estimates of growth elasticity of poverty (1990–2005), Asian subregions 
Subregion Estimated growth elasticity  (based on $1.250 PPP/day 2005) 
East Asia  –0.82 
Central and West Asia  –0.84 
The Pacific  –0.37 
South Asia  –0.66 
Southeast Asia  –0.62 
Source: Hasan et al. 2009. 
Revisiting the poverty–growth relationship 
 
Using recent observations on head count ratio ($1.25 PPP/day 2005) and Gini for reference years 
1980, 1984, 1987, 1990, 1993, 1999, 2002, and 2005 (available at World Bank Povcalnet) and 
GDP per capita from World Bank World Development Indicators database, growth and inequality 
elasticities of poverty for 21 Asian countries can be estimated.25 To allow for nonlinearity, the 
following Box-Cox model is adopted: 
Hit
( )
= 
i  1Git1
( )
 2Iit1
( )
 	it  (A7) 
where Ht
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
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

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
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From equation (A7), the poverty elasticity of growth (HG ) and poverty elasticity of inequality 
(HI ) can be derived as: 
 
HG
i  = [ˆ ˆi  ˆ1
Git1
ˆ
1
ˆ
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Iit1
ˆ
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







1]
(1ˆ )
ˆ
1Git1
ˆ   (A8) 
 
25 Two countries in East Asia, seven in Southeast Asia, five in South Asia, and seven in Central 
and West Asia. Data for five countries were excluded in the regressions due to data quality 
problem. 
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Likelihood ratio tests indicated that the relationship between poverty and other variables is 
nonlinear.26 Using the parameter estimates of the Box-Cox model, we estimate the poverty 
elasticity of growth and poverty elasticity of inequality for each reference year and country, where 
data are available (Table A4). From these estimates, and using weights based on poverty head 
count, we generate average poverty elasticity of growth and of inequality for Asia. As presented in 
Table A4, the poverty elasticity of growth is estimated to be -0.92 at the $1.25 PPP/day poverty 
line and -0.47 at the $2 PPP/day line. The estimated poverty elasticity of inequality is 0.35 for the 
$1.25 line and 0.11 for the $2 line. These mean that for every 1% growth in income, $1.25 and $2 
PPP/day poverty head count ratios are expected to drop by 0.92% and 0.47%, respectively, 
holding income distribution constant. Meanwhile, holding average income constant (i.e., no 
growth in total income), a 1% increase in income inequality as measured by the Gini would lead 
to 0.35% and 0.11% rises in the $1.25 and $2 line head count ratios, respectively. 
 
Table A4. Poverty elasticity of growth and inequality ($1.25 and $2 PPP a day), selected Asian 
countries (1984–2005) 
Reference 
year/region 
$ 1.25 $2 $ 1.25 $2 $ 1.25 $2 
HG  HI  HG  HI  HG  HI  HG  HI  HG  HI  HG  HI  
Central  Armenia Azerbaijan Georgia 
1990 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
1993 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
1996 - - - - -1.10 0.42 -0.77 0.16 - - - - 
1999 -1.36 0.51 -0.63 0.13 -1.30 0.50 -0.84 0.19 -2.59 0.99 -1.32 0.29 
2002 -1.32 0.51 -0.64 0.15 -4.39 1.72 -1.67 0.40 -1.35 0.52 -0.87 0.20 
2005 -2.94 1.18 -0.96 0.26 - -         -1.24 0.49 -0.93 0.23 
Average             
1990–2005 -1.87 0.73 -0.74 0.18 -2.26 0.88 -1.09 0.25 -1.73 0.67 -1.04 0.24 
2002-2005 -2.13 0.84 -0.80 0.20 -4.39 1.72 -1.67 0.40 -1.29 0.50 -0.90 0.21 
Central  Kazakhstan Kyrgyz Republic Tajikistan 
1990 - -         -4.07 1.52 -4.07 0.79                 
1993 -1.48 0.63 -1.59 0.55 -1.23 0.46 -1.09 0.20                 
1996 -2.10 0.86 -1.46 0.44 -1.02 0.36 -0.66 0.10                 
1999 -4.67 1.91 -1.95 0.58 -1.78 0.65 -0.84 0.15                 
2002 -1.27 0.53 -1.27 0.42 -0.71 0.27 -0.52 0.10 -0.96 0.35 -0.52 0.09 
2005 -3.35 1.43 -2.79 1.00 -0.99 0.38 -0.66 0.14 -1.39 0.52 -0.66 0.13 
Average             
1990-2005 -2.58 1.07 -1.81 0.60 -1.63 0.61 -1.30 0.25 -1.17 0.44 -0.59 0.11 
2002-2005 -2.31 0.98 -2.03 0.71 -0.85 0.32 -0.59 0.12 -1.17 0.44 -0.59 0.11 
Central  Uzbekistan*         
1990 -4.36 1.71 -3.63 0.89               
1993 -1.57 0.60 -1.21 0.26               
 
26 We reject the null hypotheses that there is a linear relationship between poverty and income 
(i.e., 
ˆ
=
ˆ
=1 or 
ˆ
=
ˆ
=-1 or 
ˆ
=
ˆ
=0) at p<0.001. 
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Reference 
year/region 
$ 1.25 $2 $ 1.25 $2 $ 1.25 $2 
HG  HI  HG  HI  HG  HI  HG  HI  HG  HI  HG  HI  
1996 -2.86 1.07 -1.67 0.32               
1999 -0.82 0.30 -0.55 0.10               
2002 -0.66 0.25 -0.43 0.08               
2005 -0.63 0.24 -0.45 0.10               
Average             
1990-2005 -1.82 0.70 -1.32 0.29         
2002-2005 -0.65 0.24 -0.44 0.09         
South  Bangladesh India Nepal 
1984 -1.00 0.36 -0.49 0.08 -0.88 0.32 -0.41 0.07 -0.73 0.26 -0.44 0.07 
1987 -0.94 0.34 -0.49 0.08 -0.87 0.32 -0.41 0.07 -0.67 0.24 -0.43 0.07 
1990 -0.90 0.32 -0.48 0.08 -0.86 0.32 -0.40 0.07 -0.67 0.24 -0.43 0.07 
1993 -0.85 0.31 -0.48 0.08 -0.86 0.32 -0.40 0.08                 
1996 -0.85 0.31 -0.49 0.08 -0.85 0.32 -0.39 0.08                 
1999 -0.75 0.27 -0.46 0.07 -0.83 0.32 -0.39 0.08 -0.79 0.28 -0.45 0.07 
2002 -0.73 0.27 -0.46 0.08 -0.80 0.31 -0.38 0.08 -0.84 0.30 -0.46 0.07 
2005 -0.76 0.28 -0.45 0.08 -0.77 0.30 -0.37 0.08 -0.87 0.31 -0.47 0.07 
Average             
1990-2005 -0.85 0.30 -0.47 0.08 -0.84 0.31 -0.39 0.08 -0.76 0.27 -0.45 0.07 
2002-2005 -0.74 0.27 -0.45 0.08 -0.78 0.30 -0.38 0.08 -0.86 0.30 -0.46 0.07 
South Asia Pakistan Sri Lanka     
1984 -0.63 0.23 -0.35 0.07 -1.30 0.49 -0.63 0.13     
1987 -0.61 0.23 -0.34 0.07 -1.34 0.51 -0.62 0.14     
1990 -0.66 0.25 -0.35 0.07                     
1993 -1.53 0.58 -0.45 0.10 -1.48 0.57 -0.67 0.15     
1996 -0.73 0.28 -0.35 0.08 -1.21 0.47 -0.64 0.15     
1999 -1.18 0.46 -0.43 0.10 -1.13 0.44 -0.67 0.16     
2002 -0.98 0.38 -0.39 0.08 -1.23 0.48 -0.72 0.18     
2005 -1.47 0.57 -0.46 0.11 -1.53 0.60 -0.82 0.20     
Average             
1990-2005 -0.97 0.37 -0.39 0.08 -1.32 0.51 -0.68 0.16     
2002-2005 -1.22 0.47 -0.42 0.10 -1.38 0.54 -0.77 0.19     
East and 
Southeast 
Asia 
Cambodia China Indonesia 
1984 - - - - -0.81 0.29 -0.43 0.07 -0.75 0.28 -0.34 0.07 
1987 - - - - -0.91 0.33 -0.44 0.08 -0.65 0.25 -0.32 0.07 
1990 - - - - -0.74 0.28 -0.41 0.08 -0.76 0.29 -0.33 0.08 
1993 - - - - -0.75 0.28 -0.41 0.08 -0.69 0.27 -0.31 0.08 
1996 -1.01 0.36 -0.53 0.08 -0.94 0.36 -0.46 0.10 -0.78 0.31 -0.32 0.08 
1999 -0.93 0.33 -0.52 0.08 -0.84 0.33 -0.46 0.11 -0.75 0.29 -0.31 0.08 
2002 -0.73 0.26 -0.47 0.08 -0.94 0.37 -0.52 0.13 -1.16 0.46 -0.37 0.10 
2005 -0.83 0.30 -0.50 0.09 -1.41 0.57 -0.69 0.19 -1.51 0.61 -0.45 0.12 
Average             
1990–2005 -0.87 0.31 -0.50 0.08 -0.92 0.35 -0.48 0.10 -0.88 0.35 -0.34 0.08 
2002–2005 -0.78 0.28 -0.49 0.08 -1.18 0.47 -0.61 0.16 -1.34 0.53 -0.41 0.11 
East and 
Southeast 
Asia  
Lao PDR Malaysia Philippines 
1984 - - - - -3.03 1.22 -2.13 0.59 -0.76 0.29 -0.45 0.10 
1987 - - - - -4.13 1.66 -2.20 0.61 -0.95 0.36 -0.50 0.11 
1990 - - - - -4.11 1.68 -2.36 0.70 -0.95 0.37 -0.52 0.11 
How Is the Global Recession Impacting on Poverty and Social Spending? | 23 
 
 
Reference 
year/region 
$ 1.25 $2 $ 1.25 $2 $ 1.25 $2 
HG  HI  HG  HI  HG  HI  HG  HI  HG  HI  HG  HI  
1993 - - - - -3.47 1.44 -2.38 0.76 -1.02 0.39 -0.54 0.11 
1996 -0.92 0.34 -0.43 0.08 -2.77 1.17 -3.21 1.09 -1.30 0.50 -0.64 0.14 
1999 -0.85 0.32 -0.41 0.08 -1.86 0.78 -2.53 0.85 -1.29 0.49 -0.64 0.14 
2002 -0.84 0.32 -0.40 0.08 -2.27 0.97 -3.30 1.17 -1.25 0.48 -0.64 0.14 
2005 - - - - -2.27 0.98 - - -1.13 0.44 -0.61 0.14 
Average             
1990-2005 -0.87 0.32 -0.42 0.08 -2.99 1.24 -2.59 0.82 -1.08 0.41 -0.57 0.12 
2002-2005 -0.84 0.32 -0.40 0.08 -2.27 0.97 -3.30 1.17 -1.19 0.46 -0.62 0.14 
East and 
Southeast  
Mongolia Thailand Vietnam 
1984 - - - - -1.00 0.38 -0.67 0.14 - - - - 
1987 - - - - -1.13 0.44 -0.72 0.16 - - - - 
1990 - - - - -1.54 0.61 -0.90 0.23 - - - - 
1993 - - - - -2.00 0.80 -1.05 0.28 - - - - 
1996 - - - - -4.54 1.85 -1.50 0.44 -0.70 0.26 -0.40 0.07 
1999 -0.90 0.34 -0.48 0.11 -6.29 2.56 -1.32 0.38                 
2002 -1.71 0.66 -0.77 0.18 -12.26 5.01 -1.74 0.51 -0.87 0.33 -0.45 0.09 
2005 -1.06 0.41 -0.59 0.14 -16.16 6.71 -2.31 0.73 -1.38 0.53 -0.58 0.12 
Average             
1990–2005 -1.22 0.47 -0.61 0.14 -5.62 2.29 -1.28 0.36 -0.98 0.37 -0.48 0.09 
2002–2005 -1.38 0.54 -0.68 0.16 -14.21 5.86 -2.03 0.62 -1.12 0.43 -0.51 0.11 
Source: Authors’ estimates. 
Table A5. Box-Cox model estimates 
Poverty line  
($ PPP per day) 
Parameter estimates Elasticity estimates 
ˆ
 
ˆ
 ˆ1  ˆ2  HG  HI  
1.25 0.46 -0.08 -8.76 2.45 -0.92 0.36 
 (0.07) (0.12) (185.89) (4.05)     
2 1.23 -0.36 -1169.86 58.78 -0.47 0.11 
 (0.14) (0.13) (159.15) (0.96)     
Notes: (i) Values in parentheses are standard errors for  and  and 2-ratios for s; (ii) n=119; (iii) Estimates 
of country intercept (
ˆi
) not reported. For $1.25 PPP/day model, intercept for the PRC, India, Indonesia, 
Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Viet Nam are significantly different from the rest at p<0.0001; 
Azerbaijan and the Kyrgz Republic at p<0.05; and Mongolia at p<0.10. For $2 PPP a day, intercept for the 
PRC, India, Indonesia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Viet Nam are 
significantly different from the rest at p<0.0001; Azerbaijan at p<0.05; and the Kyrgz Republic at p<0.1. 
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Appendix B. Short- and long-run relationship between growth and spending 
To obtain the social spending elasticity of growth, the relationships between GDP and various 
expenditures on health and education can be estimated. Data for developing Asian countries are 
available on per capita health expenditure and per capita education expenditure, from Word 
Development Indicators (WDI) Online. They are used to estimate the following model:  
ln(Sit )    0 ln(St1) 1i ln(Git ) 	 , (B1) 
where S  is per capita spending and G is GDP per capita. 
From equation (B1), the short-run spending elasticity of growth is simply 
1i  and the long-run 
spending elasticity of growth is  SLRi
Gi
Gi
SLRi
= SLRGi  =
1i
(1 0 )
. (B2) 
That is, a percentage change in GDP per capita in year t in country i would result in 
1i  
percentage change in per capita spending in year t. However, it would also affect spending in 
subsequent periods. Holding everything else constant, every one percentage GDP per capita 
shock in year t would result in  1i0  percentage change of per capita spending in year t+1, and 
1i0
2  percentage change in t+2. To generalize, for every one percentage shock in year t, per 
capita spending in year t+n would change by 1i0
n . The sum of the changes for years t to t +   
is 1i / (1 0 )   or equation (B2). 
Table B1 tabulates model estimation results for per capita health and education spending. Table 
B2 presents our estimated short- and long-run elasticities. The short-run elasticities of growth for 
public and for private spending on health ranges from 0.50–0.84 and 0.49-0.67, respectively, 
while the short-run elasticity of growth for public education is only 0.34–0.53. In Indonesia, for 
instance, a 1% increase or decrease in GDP in year t translates to a 0.62% increase or decrease 
in private health spending, a 0.55% increase or decrease in public health spending, and a 0.43% 
increase or decrease in public education in year t. Table B2 also shows how a one percentage 
increase or decrease in GDP (at t = year 1) affect social spending at t = year 2, year 3, and  . 
Clearly, a 1% increase or decrease in GDP (at t = year 1) translates to higher changes in public 
health and public education spending in the long-run.  
Estimates of long-run elasticity for per capita public health spending are 59% higher than 
estimates of short-run elasticity. For example, while a 1% increase decrease in GDP translates to 
only 0.64% increase or decrease in per capita public health spending within the same year, its 
total impact on per capita public health spending is around 1.01% increase or decrease in social 
spending, accumulated over several periods after the initial change. 
For public education spending, the ratio of long- to short-run elasticity estimates is much larger 
than in public health (by around 36%). This suggests that public education spending has higher 
dependence on previous levels of spending than on GDP growth. One of the many factors that 
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could explain this is the greater flexibility of the public health sector to absorb and use more 
resources, and at a faster pace,27 as indicated by the lower spending on health than on education.  
A decomposition of the long-run impact of an increase or decrease in GDP in year t on public 
health and education suggests that while more than half of the long-term impact on public health 
spending is experienced by Asian economies in around 3 years after the shock, half of the long-
term impact on public education is felt within 7 years after the increase or decrease in GDP. 
On the positive side, these elasticity estimates imply that when Asian economies experience 
positive growth, the private spending on health grows faster than public spending, which in turn 
also grows faster than public spending on education. Over the long run, total change in public 
spending on health is higher than both private spending on health and public spending on 
education. However, on the flipside, when Asian economies experience negative growths, total 
long-run impact on public health spending due to GDP slowdown is greatest.  
 
27 In developing countries, procurement and issuance of much-needed drugs and other health 
supplies could be faster than procurement of teaching and learning materials such as textbooks. 
It is also more feasible to expand caseload and increase resource use in public health facilities 
and community health centers than in public schools where maximum enrollment is determined at 
the beginning of the school year.  
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Table B1. Estimation results for per capita health and education spending 
Dependent variable Ln(Per capita spending at time t) 
 Private health  Public health  Public education 
Independent variables Coef   Coef   Coef  
Ln(Per capita spending at time t-1) 0.37 ** 0.37 *** 0.51 *** 
         
Ln(Per capita GDP, region and country)         
West and Central Asia         
Armenia  0.67 ***  0.64 ***  0.43 *** 
Azerbaijan  0.62 **  0.63 ***  0.43 *** 
Kazakhstan  0.69 ***  0.58 ***  0.43 *** 
Kyrgyz Republic  0.70 **  0.63 ***  0.43 *** 
Pakistan  0.55 ***  0.58 ***  0.40 *** 
Tajikistan  0.63 **  0.64 ***  0.41 *** 
Uzbekistan  0.70 **  0.61 ***    
East Asia         
China, People’s Republic of  0.68 ***  0.62 ***  0.40 *** 
Hong Kong, China        0.45 *** 
Korea, Republic of  0.70 ***  0.62 ***  0.45 *** 
Macao, China        0.43 *** 
Mongolia  0.74 ***  0.54 ***  0.47 *** 
Pacific         
Fiji Islands 0.71 ***  0.55 ***  0.47 *** 
Kiribati  0.84 ***  0.52 ***  0.53 *** 
Lao PDR  0.62 **  0.62 ***  0.41 *** 
Micronesia, Federated States of  0.81 ***  0.54 ***  0.47 *** 
Papua New Guinea  0.73 ***  0.49 ***    
Samoa  0.74 ***  0.53 ***  0.44 *** 
Timor-Leste  0.83 ***  0.57 ***    
Tonga  0.74 ***  0.55 ***  0.46 *** 
Vanuatu  0.71 ***  0.57 ***  0.48 *** 
South Asia         
Bangladesh  0.61 ***  0.59 ***  0.40 ** 
Bhutan  0.71 ***  0.55 ***  0.46 *** 
India  0.62 **  0.65 ***  0.44 *** 
Maldives  0.78 ***  0.58 ***  0.48 *** 
Nepal  0.67 **  0.65 ***  0.42 *** 
Sri Lanka  0.67 ***  0.60 ***    
Southeast Asia         
Brunei Darussalam  0.66 ***  0.51 ***  0.47 *** 
Cambodia  0.69 **  0.67 ***  0.37 ** 
Indonesia  0.62 ***  0.55 ***  0.43 *** 
Malaysia  0.68 ***  0.60 ***  0.48 *** 
Myanmar  0.50 ***  0.58 ***  0.34 *** 
Philippines  0.64 **  0.59 ***  0.42 *** 
Singapore  0.64 ***  0.61 ***    
Thailand  0.69 ***  0.56 ***  0.45 *** 
Viet Nam  0.66 **   0.65 ***       
 
Constant 0.05   0.75   1.07  
R2 0.99   0.99   0.99  
N (countries) 137 (36)  137 (36)  141 (29) 
***significant at <0.001, **at <0.005. 
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Table B2. Estimated short-run (SR) and long-run (LR) changes in spending for every one 
percentage change in GDP growth at t = year 1* 
Region and Country Per capita private health 
spending 
 Per capita public health 
spending 
 Per capita public education 
spending 
 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3    Year 1 Year 2 Year 3    Year 1 Year 2 Year 3   
West and Central Asia               
Armenia  0.67 0.25 0.09 1.06  0.64 0.24 0.09 1.03  0.43 0.22 0.11 0.88 
Azerbaijan  0.62 0.23 0.08 0.98  0.63 0.24 0.09 1.01  0.43 0.22 0.11 0.88 
Kazakhstan  0.69 0.25 0.09 1.09  0.58 0.22 0.08 0.93  0.43 0.22 0.11 0.88 
Kyrgyz Republic  0.70 0.26 0.09 1.10  0.63 0.24 0.09 1.01  0.43 0.22 0.11 0.88 
Pakistan  0.55 0.20 0.07 0.87  0.58 0.22 0.08 0.92  0.40 0.21 0.11 0.99 
Tajikistan  0.63 0.23 0.08 0.99  0.64 0.24 0.09 1.02  0.41 0.21 0.11 0.85 
Uzbekistan  0.70 0.26 0.09 1.11  0.61 0.23 0.09 0.98      
East Asia               
PRC  0.68 0.25 0.09 1.07  0.62 0.23 0.09 0.99  0.40 0.20 0.10 0.81 
Hong Kong, China            0.45 0.23 0.12 0.93 
Korea, Rep.  0.70 0.26 0.09 1.10  0.62 0.23 0.09 0.98  0.45 0.23 0.12 0.81 
Macao, China            0.43 0.22 0.11 0.93 
Mongolia  0.74 0.27 0.10 1.17  0.54 0.20 0.07 0.86  0.47 0.24 0.12 0.81 
Pacific               
Fiji Islands  0.71 0.26 0.10 1.12  0.55 0.21 0.08 0.88  0.47 0.24 0.12 0.96 
Kiribati  0.84 0.31 0.11 1.33  0.52 0.19 0.07 0.83  0.53 0.27 0.14 1.09 
Lao PDR  0.62 0.23 0.08 0.98  0.62 0.23 0.09 0.99  0.41 0.21 0.11 0.84 
Micronesia, Fed. Sts.  0.81 0.30 0.11 1.28  0.54 0.20 0.08 0.87  0.47 0.24 0.13 0.98 
Papua New Guinea  0.73 0.27 0.10 1.16  0.49 0.18 0.07 0.78      
Samoa  0.74 0.27 0.10 1.16  0.53 0.20 0.07 0.85  0.44 0.23 0.12 0.91 
Timor-Leste  0.83 0.31 0.11 1.32  0.57 0.21 0.08 0.91      
Tonga  0.74 0.27 0.10 1.16  0.55 0.20 0.08 0.87  0.46 0.23 0.12 0.06 
Vanuatu  0.71 0.26 0.10 1.12  0.57 0.21 0.08 0.90  0.48 0.25 0.13 0.06 
South Asia               
Bangladesh  0.61 0.22 0.08 0.97  0.59 0.22 0.08 0.94  0.40 0.20 0.10 0.94 
Bhutan  0.71 0.26 0.10 1.12  0.55 0.21 0.08 0.88  0.46 0.24 0.12 0.99 
India  0.62 0.23 0.08 0.98  0.65 0.24 0.09 1.03  0.44 0.22 0.12 0.82 
Maldives  0.78 0.29 0.11 1.23  0.58 0.22 0.08 0.92  0.48 0.25 0.13 0.95 
Nepal  0.67 0.25 0.09 1.06  0.65 0.24 0.09 1.04  0.42 0.22 0.11 0.90 
Sri Lanka  0.67 0.25 0.09 1.06  0.60 0.22 0.08 0.96      
Southeast Asia               
Brunei Darussalam  0.66 0.24 0.09 1.04  0.51 0.19 0.07 0.82  0.47 0.24 0.12 0.96 
Cambodia  0.69 0.25 0.09 1.09  0.67 0.25 0.09 1.07  0.37 0.19 0.10 0.77 
Indonesia  0.62 0.23 0.08 0.98  0.55 0.20 0.08 0.88  0.43 0.22 0.11 0.88 
Malaysia  0.68 0.25 0.09 1.07  0.60 0.22 0.08 0.96  0.48 0.25 0.13 0.98 
Myanmar  0.50 0.19 0.07 0.80  0.58 0.22 0.08 0.93  0.34 0.18 0.09 0.71 
Philippines  0.64 0.24 0.09 1.01  0.59 0.22 0.08 0.94  0.42 0.21 0.11 0.85 
Singapore  0.64 0.23 0.09 1.01  0.61 0.23 0.09 0.98      
Thailand  0.69 0.25 0.09 1.09  0.56 0.21 0.08 0.89  0.45 0.23 0.12 0.94 
Viet Nam  0.66 0.24 0.09 1.05  0.65 0.24 0.09 1.03      
GDP = gross domestic product, Lao PDR = Lao People’s Democratic Republic. 
Note: The year 1 impact is simply the short-run elasticity (
1i ); year 2 impact equals ( 1i0 ); year 3 impact 
equals 
1i0
2 ; and  year   impact equals the long-run elasticity. 
Source: Authors’ estimates.
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Appendix C. EIU and ADO 2009 growth projections 
Country EIU Projections ADO Projections 
 Baseline  
(Sep 2007) 
Revised  
(Apr 2009) 
Difference = 
revised – 
baseline 
Baseline (Apr 
2008) 
Revised  
(Mar 2009) 
Difference = 
revised – 
baseline 
GDP per capita (% change)       
PRC 8.7 5.5 -3.2 9.2 6.3 -2.9 
Bangladesh 4.7 3.8 -0.9 4.7 4.2 -0.5 
India 5.8 3.4 -2.4 6.9 3.5 -3.4 
Sri Lanka 5.5 2.1 -3.4 - 3.5 - 
Pakistan 4.6 -0.7 -5.3 - 1.2 - 
Indonesia 4.5 -2.4 -6.9 5.0 2.2 -2.8 
Malaysia 4.9 -4.8 -9.7 4.2 -2.2 -6.0 
Philippines 3.7 -2.3 -6.0 4.2 0.5 -3.7 
Thailand 3.9 -5.1 -9.0 1.8 -2.1 -3.9 
Vietnam 7.0 -0.7 -7.7 6.7 3.2 -3.5 
Asia*  5.0 -0.3 -5.3 7.0 2.5 -5.5 
National GDP (% change)       
PRC 9.2 6.0 -3.2 9.8 7.0 -2.8 
Bangladesh 6.4 5.5 -0.9 6.0 5.6 -0.4 
India 7.4 5.0 -2.4 8.0 5.0 -3.0 
Sri Lanka 6.0 2.6 -3.4 6.0 4.5 -1.5 
Pakistan 6.2 1.0 -5.2 6.3 2.8 -3.5 
Indonesia 5.7 -1.3 -7.0 6.0 6.1 0.1 
Malaysia 5.6 -3.0 -8.6 5.4 -0.2 -5.6 
Philippines 5.4 -0.6 -6.0 6.0 2.5 -3.5 
Thailand 4.6 -4.4 -9.0 5.0 -2.0 -7.0 
Viet Nam 8.0 0.3 -7.7 7.0 4.5 -2.5 
Asia* 6.1 0.8 -5.3 7.6 3.4 -4.2 
ADO = Asian Development Outlook, EIU = Economic Intelligence Unit, GDP = gross domestic product.  
Source of data: Table 4.5, ADO 2008, and ADO 2009. 
How is the Global Recession Impacting on Poverty and Social Spending? 
The global economic recession is severely affecting Asian economies. Timely assessment 
of the economic and social impacts is critical to the formulation and implementation of 
policy responses. This paper presents a simple methodology of ex ante impact assessment, 
focusing specifically on how the global recession will affect poverty and social expenditures 
in developing Asian countries. This involves two steps: first, to gauge how the crisis will 
affect national and household incomes; and, second, to assess how the income effects are 
transmitted to poverty and social spending.
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